continental contributions

I will take this post to share some of the key points from the essay I discussed in class today. What Standish discusses in this essay is what the term "Europe" means, particularly how it relates to the Philosophy of Education today; he discusses some of the main currents of philosophical thought that have shaped the Philosophy of Education today; the distinction between postmodernity and poststructuralism; and the institutionalization of the field in Europe.

I will discuss what I took to be some of the most significant points. The first point of emphasis is the relationship of language to thought. He shows how after Kant, the analytic and continental traditions began to arise, or rather became distinguished from one another, by Kant distinction of noumena and phenomena with the analytic tradition delving more into phenomena, and the continental tradition delving more into the noumena. This distinction gave rise to heightened sensitivity towards language in the twentieth century, with Wittgentstein being a major player in the analytic tradition, and people like Heidegger and Lyotard advocating the continental tradition.

As the continental tradition flourished, the distinction between Philosophy and Literature became more blurred with narrativism and poststructuralism developing. With narrative landscapes mapping reality, the importance of language heightened, and with heritage in Nietzche and his philosophy, the continental tradition gave rise to the poststructuralist viewpoint of the relationship between knowledge and power. As we became "better" with words, we gained power in the world, making very important what is taught and how it is taught.

All this to say, and hopefully more clearly now, that what may be gained in the Philosophy of Education from the Continental Tradition is an attentiveness to the power of language to create reality, and the need to allow the space for this to occur. How does this happen? When we look back to Nietzsche, for example, we identify ourselves as radically homeless in the world, in the sense of not really knowing where we come from, where we're going, or which myth to paint our horizon with, and given this starting point, we should remain open to many varying possibilities in the world. This relates to Philosophy of Education because keeping this in mind may open the door for innovative ways of educating.

Lastly, what the Philosophy of Education can gleam from the Continental Tradition is radical love for the Other, thus rehoning focus in education on morality. We have an absolute relation to the Other and to one another, and with this comes a sort of moral responsibility for the Other. We ought to be concerned with community, with society, because though in some senses we are radically alone in the world, we are alone together.

Cultivating...phronesis? through art

I read two articles for today. The first was by Patricia Werhane. She focused largely on the way we approach morality inside of systems. Her argument was that solutions focusing just on individuals tend to miss the larger picture. Systems are connected, organic; solutions must take account of the relationships that exist between different parts of the system. A common example of a system is a corporation.

After establishing what a system is, she contends that moral imagination is necessary to avoid immorality (or amorality) when dealing with systems. Moral imagination differs from moral reasoning; she contends that moral imagination is tantamount to thinking outside of the box (where the box = the system) whereas moral reasoning is what helps us avoid moral fantasy.

She references the South African electrical corporation Eskom, which existed during apartheid and thereby denied services to non-white South Africans. Upon reflection (she doesn't describe how this reflexive process began) they started hiring non-white employees and expanding services. This approach extended to all parts of the business.

I found this article interesting, but had a few questions. First, I still don't understand how Eskom was an example of the use of moral imagination. I don't doubt that it was, but the process isn't clear to me. Second, it seems to imply that there originally existed some desire for change. The more interesting question for me is how we facilitate change in people who otherwise would have no such desire. She talks about how identifying the parts of the system most prone to change is imoportant, but I think more work could be done here.

Second, I read Art, Imagination, and the Cultivation of Morals by Andrew Kieran. This article was really interesting. He seems to be making a fine distinction: Art is not merely a way of getting at knowledge we already have of morality--it isn't purely instrumental--but is actually apart of the formative process. It shapes our understanding. Art is a way of seeing morality. He uses the term "imaginative understanding" to describe this process. He mentions Aristotle, but does not focus too much here--would it be a misinterpretation to say the process he is describing is that of cultivating phronesis?

He tries to avoid pure aestheticism in favor of ethicism; one argument he makes is that art that misrepresents really is flawed, even if the part of really it misrepresents is ethics. He describes Nazi propaganda here. The take home point is that philosophy and art are not at odds with each other--one still needs moral reflection through reason and philosophical texs--but that art should not be considered a mere subsidiary. Art and philosophy are in conversation with one another.

Statement of Intent

The main question I wish to pursue in this seminar is “What is the value of a liberal education?” This entails, then, my own thoughts of what education (institutionally speaking, i.e. curriculum, etc.) ought to be as I’ll be making an argument as to why one should pursue a liberal education as opposed to the a more narrowly focused education. I do recognize, however, that this is my preliminary intent and perhaps my view on the topic may change with further research. 

My interest here is quite frankly the result of my own educational experience and the fact that I’m nearing its end. I suppose I’m looking for some affirmation that my educational experience was the best that it could have been, or at least that the various institutions I was enrolled in afforded me the best possibilities for my own intellectual growth. 

Imperfect Procedural Epistemology

This will be brief, yet potentially helpful (it was for me). We have discussed knowledge and truth to some extent in class, and as Elgin has clarified distinctions about these topics for me, I will share these clarifications with you.

When we talk about knowledge in class, I often am thinking in absolutes and universals, and I would say our language often insinuates absolutes and universals, at least in part. What Elgin distinguishes is that there is a type of epistemology that deals with reality this way, and it is called perfect procedural epistemology. In this way of thinking, roughly speaking, the world is more or less black and white. There is right and wrong, moral and immoral. Few systems of thought fit well within this epistemological style.

So we may benefit in our conversations in class to think in terms of imperfect procedural epistemology rather than perfect procedural epistemology. This is the case because if we operate within this epistemological schema, we can approximate knowledge via coherence and correspondence, albeit we are indeed left with questions about whether our way of valuing knowledge is founded.

We can talk in class by referring to history and to the various fields of inquiry that exist, and what has been the standard for counting something as knowledge. We get somewhere by doing this, though we could be wrong. I'm okay with this right now, and I hope you all may be okay with this also.

Defining Understanding

Richard Mason, pg 1
"The title of this book is reflexive because the subject matter is. Anyone presenting a theory about understanding must be aiming to understand it: surely a philosophical task. But there is need to tread carefully, to avoid begging the question. To set off by trying to define understanding would be a poor start. Can we assume that a definition--or theory--offers a route to understanding?"

After rereading this, I thought understanding is quite ineffable, and nailing it down to a single definition or theory would be narrowing, if not obfuscatory. If any theory applies to understanding it must be one that preserves, or even enhances and furthers the diaspora of definitions or theories, that is encourages a variety of understandings.
The end of chapter 3, Mason writes, "A more positive conclusion might be that liberation from a model of understanding based on epistemology might be beneficial. Instead of looking for a fundamental, reductionist theory of understanding, we could simply try to understand it, in its manifold forms," (pg 49).
I agree with Mason on this, and would like to hear your thoughts; if you haven't fallen asleep yet.

***

On pg 25 of Mason's book he discusses how capacity as a model for understanding is rather inadequate. Critiquing Ryle's suggestion, "overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of minds; they are those workings," Mason goes on to posit that "to understand--in a case where what happens, is entirely private within someone's mind." (pg 26). This seemed, to me, to fit nicely with Nelson Goodman's understanding of understanding; "comprehension and creation go on together," (pg 72). Yet Goodman seems to purport that capacity is a natural consequence of understanding; "Perceiving motion often consists in producing it. Discovering laws involve drafting them. Recognizing patterns is very much a matter of inventing and imposing them." And Mason, as well, recognizes that there must be "some cases where a capacity to do something would be a necessary condition for understanding." However, Mason then contrasts how one must speak a language to understand it, with the example of a translation machine and its inability to understand the words it translates.

Capacity seems central to our discussion on education considering most, if not all, education consists of judging a student's capacity to do something, and not whether a student understands beyond that task. Moreover, considering Mason's thoughts on understanding being a private matter, and also Goodman's 'comprehension-creation,' it would be difficult, if not impossible, to balance judging or grading a students capacity with the possibility or probability of suffocating the creativity inherent with understanding. In other words, to steal Mason's quote from WE Johnson: "If I say that a sentence has meaning for me no one has a right to say it is senseless," (pg 26).
I feel going one step further, and saying that our current systems of education are counterproductive to the interests of furthering understanding (insofar as grading/judging, what is correct understanding and what is not), is not to much of a stretch considering Goodman's and Mason's articles thus far. Though, Mason has a lot of work to do still in his book.

"Power of Pictures" and what not

Regarding the “Power of Pictures,” Robert Schwartz discusses Picasso’s portrait of Gertrude Stein. Initial reaction to the portrait was that it didn’t even look like Stein. Picasso’s reaction, however, was simply, “Everybody thinks she is not at all like her portrait, but never mind, in the end she will manage to look just like it.” What’s really being said here is that the portrait will literally change the way Stein looks, or at least how she looks to us. This is accomplished by accenting certain features that are typically outside of our typical perception of Stein, and ignoring others that are typically a subject of greater focus. Features aren’t being actually created here, nor are some features being erased. All of these features are always present in a physical sense. What is happening is that Picasso is shifting our focus. And since we come to determine and understand reality through our perceptions, this shift in focus seems to actually change reality.

            Schwartz also mentions that he may also argue that scientists and theorists are also makers of reality. For example, theories of the sun inform our perception of it and essentially shape our personal realities. And it’s this point that weighs very heavily for the philosophy of education to me. How much power does an instructor really have regarding the education of his or her students? My initial inclination was to view the instructor as being a conduit to knowledge and reality for the student, but now it seems impossible to ignore the power to create reality that an instructor may have. 

Art/Literature and moral education

First off, I'd like to note that I feel neglected. Our blog does not have a link from the front page of JMc's main blog. Are you ashamed of us?

I'll use this post to describe and comment on an article I read, "The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge." At first, I read his post completely the wrong way. Arrogantly, I treated him as an outsider to philosophy, bitter for one reason or another. I realized that Carroll was quite well read as I continued, however.

Carroll first describes the three main arguments against the idea that literature and art can provide moral knowledge. They are as follows:

(1) The knowledge gained from art or literature is trivial.
(2) When does not learn anything from art or literature; it merely implies or suggests.
(3) Art or literature does not debate or defend claims, thus making it a deficient (or, even, nonexistent) form of knowledge.

After reading these arguments, I found the third to be the most compelling in light of the reading I've been doing in other classes. It seems like good arguments (which form the basis for knowledge) ought to stand up to criticism. But who is to stand up for a novel?

The minor argument presented, though one I find entirely compelling, is that literature is same in many respects to a thought experiment in philosophy. When we talk about a veil of ignorance, or the Ring of Gyges, we are trying to draw from one's apriori knowledge, something intuitive to them. Novels often have just as much intention as a philosopher has in using a particular thought experiment or example.

The primary claim advanced is that art and literature have much more conceptual discrimination than they are given credit for. By this, he means that there are distinctions between characters drawn--largely in the form of virtue or ethics--that allows us to analyze, scrutnize, and form judgments. He gives the example of several novels to demonstrate this. The dialogue I discuss as important to philosophy above comes into play when individuals engage in dialogue about the characters in the play.

I am compelled by his argument. In relation to our discussion, I think that there is something important. Children (and teenagers) are often incapable of engaging in and understanding in depth philosophical discussion. While I personally think they should be exposed to it, not everything will sink in. Literature can provide a way of engaging issue of ethics at a more real world level. The connections are clearer, and if there really is conceptual discrimination in the novel, adequate discussion can take place. I think novels are particularly important if one believes in virtue ethics. This is a prime way to develop the character necessary for moral decisionmaking. In some ways, the vagueness of novels also lends to the development of critical self reflection.

Truth as Relative

Blake Daniel Brown
Philosophy Senior Seminar
7 February 2009

Truth as Relative

Nelson Goodman shows us that the worlds or paradigms that we live in and operate out of are always relative and in the process of being created. He describes “truth” as a possibility of meaning making in language. In the case of beholding something as beautiful, we don’t say that it is “true” in the sense of propositionally so; we may say it is “true” in the sense of “right” or “good”. Therefore, to say that science has truth “right”, or that religion has the corner on the market, is erroneous in the sense of language. This is the case because the propositions indicate a universal sense of “truth” that simply is not apprehensible apart from operating from within a particular world, where “given X criteria for truth, Y”. We are not gods, so we know from within a world, and our knowledge is at best proximal.
I take Goodman to be advocating for many avenues of inquiry into the ways of worlds. Which world is “right” is a bad question, but we can say, “Given X goal, which world is most expedient for achieving this goal?” Then there can be a right or wrong answer, based on agreed upon modes of measurement and valuation. This is a license to be rigorously creative. We need not quibble about who’s right in many cases, and we benefit from valuing various ways of being-in and creating worlds.

Proactive Knowledge, Understanding & Education

Having read nothing more on these topics since our last meeting, here are some thoughts that I toss out for you all to consider and comment on

I think that Proactive Knowledge comes in two varieties (and there probably isn’t a strict boundary): skills and information

Skills

To proactively know a skill one would recognize when the skill was relevant and be, in some sense of the word, compelled to use the skill

For example, reading this is something that you can’t avoid doing if you look at the words. It’s impossible for you to experience an opportunity to read without, in fact, reading. Sadly, there are few other skills that are as unavoidably prompted.

Information

Proactive knowledge of information would involve the ability to recognize when information is relevant in context outside of the domain in which information was learned – the Ohm’s law example would be an example of this.

Understanding

Okay, a way that I’ve been thinking about this is to see if I can figure out what I mean when I say “I don’t understand.” Against what I suggested Thursday, I’m now thinking that we only use “understand” in one way – “have the entire picture.” When I say that I don’t understand the causes of the VietNam War, I think I’m saying that I don’t have the entire picture – which would be all the pieces (which would come from may different realms) and how the pieces fit together (or the multiple way in which the pieces might fit together)


Back to Education

As a teacher, I want students to gain proactive knowledge (of both skills & information) and I also want students to want understanding and to have some tools for pursuing it. I think that the desire for understanding is curiosity.

Articles/Questions

I am particularly interested in reading articles surrounding understanding and art, literature, and morality. I also think more general discussion of what it means to understand would be helpful, which will require reading more articles on that topic.

What are you all interested in reading? Has anyone figured out what our question is?

Relevence of 'Truth Matters' to our needs

What are we doing in this Senior Seminar? Epistemology, or metaphysics or...what?

In Lynch's preface he writes "This book is about why truth matters in our personal and political lives. The last hundred years have seen a considerable amount of writing on truth by philosophers, but much of it has been preoccupied with formal questions of definition and paradox," (pg xi; italics added for emphasis).
Are we not 'preoccupied' with formal questions of definitions and paradoxes concerning truth in this class?
I was told, in email exchanges, that I was confusing metaphysical questions of truth's connection with reality, while we are concerned with epistemological questions of...whatever, not that apparently. Also, I infer from page 38, "But it may also indicate that Foucault just isn't worried about metaphysical questions of the nature of truth..." that Lynch is concerned with metaphysics and the nature of truth. Are we concerned with metaphysics, or epistemology, or both?

"While this work is of considerable importance, it can leave the average person feeling rather nonplussed; it rarely addresses the concerns that cause us to worry about truth in the first place. One of the aims of this book is to correct that," (pg xi).

So, I gather from this that Lynch is concerned with that which causes the average person to worry about truth in the first place. It would seem then, Lynch's book assumes that the average person is worrying about truth, and therefore is already in agreement with Lynch's proposition that Truth Matters (otherwise they wouldn't be worrying about it, ay?)
So, it appears to me that this book functions as a self-help for those who are drowning in "simple minded, cynical, false, unhappy, sweet lies," (titles of various chapters and sections of Lynch's book).
Very scholarly, indeed.
Please note the sarcasm, which I assume is valid argument, since Lynch's book is riddled with ad hominems and the like.
I mean this in jest, and will try to reserve judgment until the end of his little novel, but I would like to know what relevance this has to our discussion? What are we to get out of Lynch's book except for a good laugh at his expense, or mine considering I bought the book. Oh, dear god, he got me! I bought the book so truth must matter to me, damn you Lynch!
Oh, yeah and what is our discussion focus, exactly?

James on Pragmatism

Here are two pieces by James that might help you to get a sense of his position. One's here and another is here

Chapter 5

Of course, the chapter on pragmatism caught my eye and I read it very closely for Lynch's critiques of the system. He levels some basic charges at pragmatism including relativism, self-contradiction, the past depends on the future, and the aim of truth is different than the aim of justification (pragmatically). I'll try to deal with each as briefly as I can.

Lynch says that James' pragmatism (or classical pragmatism) is relativist in that the conceptions that we hold are beneficial to us individually. What Lynch confuses here, I believe, is the concept of truth-value (that's what I call it) and Truth. Truth (capital T) is what the universe is composed of, also called matter or nature (I don't think James would have a problem with this). For us, being only a very small part of the universe, obtaining Truth is monumental (if not impossible) task. When James talks about truth he is equating it with the feedback (truth-value) we get from the universe when we act based upon the beliefs that we maintain. The example that I always use to explain this is that if we maintain a belief that we can walk through walls, the truth-value of that belief is that we end up with a lot of bruises when we test the belief. If we don't modify that belief, it is detrimental to us (unless we happen to find the bruises useful in some fashion). Beliefs that have no truth-value, meaning that they don't change the way we act, are meaningless. When viewed in this way, all beliefs have a truth-value, that which occurs in the world when we act based on a belief. James applied this largely to questions that we have no answer for such as whether God, free will, etc. exists. The instrumentalist expands this view to the rest of the questions that we think we have (universal) answers for.

What Lynch would like to say is that if there is no independent method for determining what justifies beliefs, then the danger is radical relativism. How he does it is by ignoring a very important piece of James' pragmatism. That is that the reality in which we live contains other beings that not only share in the feedback that we experience (same type of, not the exact same) with which we can share (James would say that we are obligated to share) these beliefs to be critiqued and examined. These critiques either assist in justification or diminish the justification. And there is the independent method.

As for the past depending on the future, this was an argument that I could make no sense of. I can tell you that James would say that there is a reality in which time passes and that time before now is fixed. In essence, once events have occurred there is no way to change them. The only malleable thing in this equation is our reflection upon those events and the beliefs that we maintain about them. What Lynch is trying to say is that there is some connection between what is real and what is true. I don't think James would say that he has a problem with that insofar as we don't claim that we can get unrestricted access to either. To assert that pragmatism maintains some implication on the past that changes it based upon our current conceptions is a step far afield from what James believed.

For Lynch on Rorty, we would not aim at justification if Truth wasn't what we are after. Rorty says that when we go about looking for Truth, justification is all we get. Therefore, there is no difference and it is really justification that we are seeking. The difference here is that Lynch still ideally wants to believe that his ideas are true and that we (universally) want to believe that our ideas are true. The pragmatist rejects this (and thusly, proves the universality of the claim as false). The pragmatist doesn't ultimately care about what is true because of the questionable nature of such assertions being applied to statements. The pragmatist cares about resolving the problems that we face right now in the context of right now (who we are, what we "know", where we've been, and where we are looking to be).

I hope that's a good summarization and compelling argument against what Lynch is claiming as faults in pragmatism. It seems to me to be a failure of an idealist approach to appreciate a realistic one. Lynch appears to maintain that there is truth out there (and I don't think many pragmatists would disagree) and that we should be continuing the struggle to obtain it (whereas pragmatists look to place value in concepts where it could be more effective).